Cartels 2025

EU Law and Practice Contributed by: Andrzej Kmiecik, Richard Burton and Catherine Gordley, Van Bael & Bellis

5.9 Timeline of Cartel Enforcement Process Cartel investigations before the European Com - mission typically last around four to six years, depending on numerous factors, such as: • the number of parties involved; • the volume of evidence; • the complexity of legal issues involved; and • whether the Commission explores settling the case with the parties. Any appeal before the EU General Court may typically take an additional two to four years, and any further appeal to the CJEU an additional one to two years. Under EU law, the EU competition rules are directly enforceable by private parties before the national courts of the EU member states. In relation to cartel conduct, this private right of action is most often used to bring damages claims against companies that have been found to have participated in a cartel. This right to bring a claim for damages is specifically enshrined in the EU Damages Directive. The Damages Directive harmonises the condi - tions under which actions for damages may be brought before national courts, and has been transposed into national law in each EU member state. In short, the Damages Directive aims to preserve the effectiveness of antitrust enforce - ment tools by ensuring, inter alia, that: • those harmed by cartels enjoy a right to full compensation; 6. Civil Litigation 6.1 Private Rights of Action

• claimants benefit from minimum standards of disclosure of evidence; • final decisions of the European Commission or national competition authorities are, as a matter of evidence, legally presumed to have occurred; • a minimum limitation period of five years is established in each member state; • cartelists may be held jointly and severally liable for cartel infringements; and • national courts may estimate the rate of passing-on and quantify the harm caused by a cartel. The Damages Directive gives evidential value to administrative decisions of the Commission and a national competition authority in actions before national courts. The findings made by the Com - mission in any infringement decision are bind - ing on national courts. As a result, most private actions brought are “follow-on” actions based on a final cartel decision rather than “stan- dalone” actions. 6.2 Collective Action While the Damages Directive harmonises nation - al rules to the extent necessary to ensure that victims of EU competition law infringements have effective mechanisms to obtain redress for harm suffered, it does not require member states to introduce collective redress mechanisms. Therefore, the possibility of bringing collective action for infringements of EU competition law will depend on national procedural rules. 6.3 Indirect Purchasers and “Passing On” Defences The Damages Directive requires all member states to allow indirect purchasers to claim dam - ages for harm caused by a cartel infringement.

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