MEXICO Trends and Developments Contributed by: Rodrigo Buj García, María José Jiménez Neria and Flora Astrid Alvarez Acosta, Malpica, Iturbe, Buj & Paredes
Malpica, Iturbe, Buj & Paredes #350 Floor 14 Av. Paseo de la Reforma Mexico City Mexico Tel: +52 555 280 1551 Email: contacto@mibp.com.mx Web: www.mibp.com.mx
Antitrust Policy in Mexico: A Third Chapter in the Making Mexico is undergoing a profound transformation in its antitrust framework, ushering in a new era in which enforcement powers are once again concentrated in a single authority: the National Antitrust Commission (CNA). This new body will operate as a decentralised agency of the executive branch, formally attached to the Ministry of Economy, and – once constituted – will assume responsibility for implementing and enforcing the recently reformed Federal Economic Competition Law (LFCE). In Mexico, competition policy can be traced through three key stages. The first began in 1993 with the enactment of the country’s first antitrust law and the establishment of the Federal Competition Commis - sion (CFC), which marked the creation of a specialised authority empowered to investigate and sanction anti- competitive practices. The second stage emerged from the 2013 constitu - tional reform that created two constitutional autono - mous bodies: the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) and the Federal Telecom - munications Institute (IFT) – the latter serving as the competition authority for the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. This reform also paved the way for a new LFCE in 2014, which strengthened the legal framework and introduced specialised courts, thereby enhancing the administration of justice in competition matters. In the following years, both COFECE and the IFT consolidated their roles, with greater resources and
technical capacity that allowed them to expand inves - tigations, impose significant sanctions and increase their institutional relevance. However, during President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s administration, their autonomy came under political scrutiny. This ultimate - ly led – under President Claudia Sheinbaum’s term – to a new constitutional reform and amendments to the LFCE that reincorporated COFECE into the executive branch and transferred to it the powers previously held by the IFT in telecommunications and broadcasting. This article examines the scope and implications of these recent constitutional and legal reforms, and their potential impact on the structure, independence and effectiveness of competition policy in Mexico. COFECE and the CNA: From Constitutional Autonomy to Executive Oversight On 23 December 2024, a constitutional reform dis - solved several autonomous constitutional bodies, including COFECE and the IFT. With this reform, Congress made explicit its decision to reincorporate competition authority into the executive branch, end - ing constitutional autonomy and centralising powers under direct executive oversight. This was followed by a Reform Decree to the LFCE, published in the Fed - eral Official Gazette on 16 July 2025, which provided further detail on the institutional design of the new antitrust watchdog. The CNA was established as a decentralised body ascribed to the Ministry of Economy. Although under the authority of the Ministry, the CNA is formally grant - ed legal personality and technical and operational independence in its decision-making, organisational
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