MEXICO Trends and Developments Contributed by: Rodrigo Buj García, María José Jiménez Neria and Flora Astrid Alvarez Acosta, Malpica, Iturbe, Buj & Paredes
structure and internal operations. It also assumed jurisdiction over the telecommunications and broad - casting sectors, which were previously within the remit of the IFT. Although the reform formally preserves the CNA’s independence, in practice it is likely that the Ministry of Economy will exercise effective oversight. While such oversight could shape enforcement priorities by align - ing investigations with the executive branch’s policy agenda (potentially focusing on cases perceived as delivering national benefits), this influence also risks undermining impartiality, as competition cases may be resolved under political pressure rather than on technical grounds. Whether the CNA can operate with genuine independence within this framework remains uncertain. The reform does, however, stipulate that the current head of the Investigative Authority of COFECE will remain in office within the CNA. This continuity may serve as a stabilising factor and help preserve institu - tional know-how during the transition. It is also note - worthy that the reform does not alter the Investigative Authority’s structural independence from the board – a feature that has been central to ensuring impartial and technically rigorous investigations. A highly relevant change concerns the appointment of commissioners. Under the prior framework, COFECE had seven commissioners selected through a process overseen by an evaluation committee composed of the heads of the Bank of Mexico, the National Insti - tute for the Evaluation of Education, and the National Institute of Statistics and Geography. This committee was responsible for administering knowledge-based examinations and submitting a shortlist of qualified candidates to the executive, which would then nomi - nate one for the Senate’s approval. Under the new model, the CNA’s board is composed of five commissioners appointed directly by the executive branch and ratified by the Senate, with no evaluation committee or technical examinations. This scheme might pose a serious risk to the technical qualifications of commissioners.
Exercising the powers of a competition authority requires both independence and high-level exper - tise in economics and law. While the previous frame - work was not without flaws, it provided safeguards to ensure that commissioners possessed the skills to evaluate complex market dynamics and design effective enforcement strategies. By design, the new model eliminates those safeguards, raising the risk that appointments will be driven by political consid - erations rather than professional merit. In a jurisdiction where competition enforcement already faces struc - tural challenges, this is particularly concerning. Moreover, the reform removes all sitting commission - ers, granting President Claudia Sheinbaum the power to appoint the entire new board. Yet, the decree sets no deadline for the CNA’s formal constitution. This institutional vacuum generates significant uncertainty for the market, as, under the transitory provisions of the reform, COFECE continues to operate under the previous legal framework until the CNA is estab - lished. This raises doubts regarding the applicability of substantive reforms (such as lower merger notifi - cation thresholds) and, more concerningly, has led to the suspension of investigations initiated by COFECE and the IFT. The absence of a clear timetable for the CNA’s consol - idation undermines legal certainty and poses risks for businesses and investors that rely on predictable and effective competition enforcement. This uncertainty is particularly undesirable as Mexico prepares for major international events (such as the FIFA World Cup in 2026), which require a stable regulatory environment to attract and safeguard investment. In sum, the recent constitutional and legislative reforms represent a fundamental restructuring of Mexico’s competition policy, shifting from a model of constitutional autonomy to one of executive oversight. While the CNA preserves certain formal guarantees – such as legal personality, budgetary autonomy and operational independence – its reincorporation into the executive branch, the concentration of appoint - ment powers in the executive, the elimination of technical evaluation mechanisms and the absence of a clear timetable for its establishment raise serious concerns about its capacity to act independently and
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