MEXICO Trends and Developments Contributed by: Rodrigo Buj García, María José Jiménez Neria and Flora Astrid Alvarez Acosta, Malpica, Iturbe, Buj & Paredes
to prioritise competition enforcement over political considerations. This transformation has created procedural gaps and operational uncertainty at a time when impartial oversight is most needed. With international commit - ments ahead and persistent competitive challenges across key sectors, the coming years will be decisive in testing whether the CNA can maintain the credibil - ity, technical rigour and enforcement capacity required to safeguard predictable and competitive markets in Mexico. Hopefully, this new framework will at least ensure that the cases prioritised by the authority are those most relevant to the national economy, thereby aligning enforcement with the broader public interest. Investigations: Shorter Deadlines, Higher Fines and the Trade-Offs In addition to the institutional restructuring, the reform of the LFCE also introduces substantive modifica - tions that reshape the scope and severity of antitrust enforcement in Mexico. Among others, these include: • an amendment to the catalogue of absolute monopolistic practices; • expansion of the potential effects under which relative monopolistic practices may be sanctioned; and • a significant increase in the maximum fines appli - cable for infringements. Taken together, these changes alter the risk profile for companies operating in the Mexican market, mak - ing it essential for firms to reassess their compliance frameworks and competition strategies under the new regime. Hardcore cartels Regarding absolute monopolistic practices (hardcore cartels), Article 53 of the LFCE was amended to modify the way that information exchanges are treated. Previ - ously, subsection V expressly classified agreements to the “exchange of information with any of the objects or effects referred to in the preceding provisions” as per se illegal. Thereunder, it was interpreted that the authority had to prove both the existence of an agree -
ment to exchange information and that such agree - ment or exchange of information had the object or effect of facilitating collusive practices. Following the reform, information exchanges are no longer listed as an independent category but have been incorporated into the introductory paragraph of Article 53 as one of the means through which competitors may collude. According to the legislative rationale, the change aims to reduce the evidentiary burden on the authorities: it is now sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an information exchange whose object or effect is price-fixing, output restrictions, market division or bid rigging. By embedding information exchanges directly in the general clause, the reform strengthens the authorities’ capacity to prosecute these practices more effectively. A broader concern is that the LFCE continues to provide limited legal certainty as to how absolute monopolistic practices will be distinguished from both legitimate, pro-competitive collaboration among competitors and agreements that have no appreci - able effect on the market. This uncertainty has been further aggravated by the fact that COFECE’s board never approved the Draft Guidelines on Collabora - tion Agreements Between Competitors, which were released for public consultation in 2020 but were never finally adopted. While the law enumerates categories of per se illegal conduct, it does not establish under what circum - stances innocuous communications or efficiency- enhancing initiatives will fall outside the scope of enforcement. This ambiguity is particularly problem - atic in markets where data sharing, joint initiatives or industry associations can promote innovation, improve standards or simply involve exchanges that lack any competitive relevance. Without clear safe harbours or authoritative guidance, firms face a heightened risk that even neutral or beneficial conduct could be con - strued as collusion. The absence of precision in the statutory framework therefore creates a chilling effect, discouraging co-operation and undermining the bal - ance between deterring cartel behaviour and fostering competitive dynamics.
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