Antitrust Litigation 2025

CHILE Trends and Developments Contributed by: Claudio Lizana, Daniela León, Tomás Appelgren and Thomas Stöcklin, Estudio Lizana

Estudio Lizana Candelaria Goyenechea 3900 Oficina 303, Vitacura Santiago de Chile Chile Tel: +56 9 9237 1671 Email: clizana@estudiolizana.cl Web: www.estudiolizana.cl

Introduction In Chile, antitrust litigation takes place before the Tri- bunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia (TDLC), established in 2003. The TDLC is a specialised court mainly responsible for hearing and judging legal con - flicts arising from anti-competitive conduct. Sepa - rately, there is a competition agency called Fiscalía Nacional Económica (FNE), which is responsible for investigating such conduct and filing complaints against those who carry them out. Unlike many other jurisdictions, Chile allows not only the FNE but also private entities, consumer associations, and individu - als to bring antitrust lawsuits before the TDLC. In the TDLC’s more than two decades of history, there has been a significant increase in the number of cases heard by the court. For example, between January 2005 and December 2010, only eight new cases were brought before the court, while between January 2024 and May 2025 (less than a year and a half), 87 new cases have been initiated. Many of these cases, however, are not litigation, but non-contentious proceedings (known as “consulta - tions”), in which the TDLC is consulted on whether a certain act or contract may infringe competition law. These proceedings have fewer procedural steps than litigation and are therefore less time-consuming. The general perception is that, in recent times, there has been a certain abuse in the use of the power to request the initiation of non-contentious proceedings. This is because, on many occasions, these are cases that contain a “hidden” contentious claim, and that are only distinguished from a contentious proceed - ing in that the party submitting the consultation does

not request the imposition of fines. The proliferation of these non-contentious initiatives partly explains the visible increase in the burden on the court. This trend could change, however, based on the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling on consultations, as explained below. Another factor that may account for the increase in liti - gation in competition matters is the granting, through successive legal reforms, of more powers and tools to the FNE to investigate cartels, which has led this authority to intensify its activity in the enforcement of this type of conduct. This, together with a more fre - quent use of the leniency programme (introduced in 2009), as well as greater demand for accountability in the most high-profile cases, has increased the number of court proceedings related to cartel cases. Private companies, for their part, have not been left behind, increasingly attempting antitrust actions for both unilateral conduct and unfair competition. Fur - thermore, consumer associations have taken on a significant role in defending competition, by filing law - suits against antitrust abuses, actively participating in cartel litigation as interested third parties, and seeking compensation for damages for Chilean consumers. At the same time, the level of complexity of antitrust litigation before the TDLC has been increasing, with highly technical proceedings that require studying and processing large volumes of data and evidence, which has represented a significant challenge in the evolu - tion of the system.

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