Antitrust Litigation 2025

CHILE Trends and Developments Contributed by: Claudio Lizana, Daniela León, Tomás Appelgren and Thomas Stöcklin, Estudio Lizana

Considering all the above, it is not surprising that TDLC proceedings, which may subsequently continue before the Supreme Court in the event of appeals, are often lengthy, sometimes lasting several years. The ongoing challenge is therefore to find mechanisms to expedite the processing of these cases, to guarantee timely access to justice in antitrust matters. The following summarises some of the most relevant developments in antitrust litigation in Chile in recent times. Growing Interest of the FNE in Digital Markets In May 2025, the FNE filed a lawsuit against Goog - le LLC, accusing it of restricting competition in the markets for the distribution of apps and the distri - bution of in-app paid digital goods, both within the Android operating system, at least since 2019. The FNE requested that the TDLC fine Google UTA101,482 (approximately USD89 million) and impose a series of behavioural remedies, including: • allowing the distribution of third-party app stores through Google Play; • refraining from conditioning access to Google products or services, payments, or revenue sharing on the execution of agreements requiring the pre- installation of Google Play in a specific location on the device’s interface; and • eliminating any instance, action, or message that is unjustified and/or disproportionate and that discourages ‒ or is capable of discouraging ‒ the downloading of apps and/or app stores through channels other than Google Play, among others. Additionally, in June 2025, the FNE filed another law - suit concerning digital markets, accusing Delivery Hero S.E. and Glovoapp23 S.A. of allegedly partici - pating in a zone allocation cartel in the food deliv - ery platform market. This case constitutes the FNE’s first lawsuit concerning collusion in digital markets in Chile. The lawsuit arose from an investigation prompt - ed by the detection of cross-shareholdings between competitors, which, according to the FNE, ultimately uncovered the existence of an international market allocation cartel operating in Chile, Egypt, Peru, and Ecuador. The FNE requested that Delivery Hero be fined UTA63,096 (approximately USD54 million) and

Glovo UTA21,849 (approximately USD18.8 million). The disparity in these amounts is due to Glovo exit - ing the Chilean market as part of the alleged agree - ment, making it impossible to calculate the sales or economic benefits attributable to the conduct in Chile. Consequently, the FNE requested the imposition of a discretionary fine for Glovo, given the special cir - cumstances of the case. In the case of Delivery Hero, the FNE increased the amount of the fine due to the involvement of senior executives, the company’s awareness of the unlawful nature of the conduct, the harm caused to innovation, and its obstruction of the investigation. In Chile, the prohibition of horizontal interlocking directorates has been in force since 2017. Specifically, Article 3 (d) of the Chilean Competition Act (Decree Law 211, DL 211) penalises the simultaneous par - ticipation of the same person as a board member or key executive in two or more “competing compa - nies”. This applies when the annual revenues of the corporate group to which each competing company belongs exceed UF100,000 (approximately USD4.1 million) in the previous calendar year. Interlocking Litigation Interlocking in Chile Although there is consensus that Article 3 (d) prohibits horizontal direct interlocking (ie, when the same per - son serves as key executive or director board mem - ber in companies that compete directly), experts still discuss whether this prohibition extends to indirect interlocking. This has been highlighted in the only two interlocking disputes existing to date, namely FNE v Hernán Büchi, Consorcio, Falabella, and Banco de Chile (the Büchi case); and FNE v Juan José Hurtado, Consorcio, and Larraín Vial (the Hurtado case). Both cases arose from lawsuits filed by the FNE in Decem - ber 2021, which were the result of an ex officio inves - tigation instructed by the FNE in September 2019. Discussion on the concept of “competing companies” Although many interesting matters were brought up by the parties during the two trials, the most important discussion concerned the scope of the concept of competing companies.

47 CHAMBERS.COM

Powered by