ITALY Trends and Developments Contributed by: Enrico Maria Mancuso, Federico Bracalente, Marco Accorroni and Marco Mariotti, Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer LLP
However, the Directive does not require the reintro - duction of the former Article 323 ICC: the Italian law - maker is free to design a new, more precisely defined offence calibrated to the Directive’s minimum stand - ards (such as requiring a “serious breach of law” and the causation of substantial damage). Article 6 of the Directive and its implications Article 6 of the Directive – on trading in influence – cre - ates another pressing, if less politically visible, compli - ance challenge. The current post-reform formulation of Article 346-bis ICC appears to be narrower than the Directive’s Article 6 standard in at least two material respects: • it implies a requirement of an existing relationship or specific connection, whereas the Directive cov - ers both genuine and merely asserted influence; and • it requires that the illicit mediation be directed at inducing the public official to commit a specific criminal offence, whereas the Directive extends to any “improper influence” over the exercise of official functions. The Italian lawmaker will need to assess whether a legislative adjustment to Article 346-bis ICC – poten - tially including the introduction of a lobbying regula - tion framework, as urged by the Constitutional Court in Judgment No 185/2025 – is required to achieve compliance with Article 6. Articles 13 and 14 – corporate criminal liability The Directive’s requirements on corporate liability – that legal persons be liable for corruption offences committed for their benefit – are broadly consist - ent with the framework of Italy’s existing Legislative Decree No 231 of 8 June 2001. The principal area requiring attention is the calibration of financial penalties. According to the Directive, fines for the legal entity can amount to up to 5% of world - wide annual turnover (or EUR40 million) for the most serious offences. This amount significantly exceeds the existing maxima, and will require a structural recal - ibration of the pecuniary sanction regime for at least the catalogue offences covered by the Directive.
In addition, the Italian regime structures the entity’s compliance models and preventive measures as an exemption from liability, rather than as a constitutive element of a “failure to prevent” offence. The law - maker may need to confirm, as part of transposition, that its framework is substantively equivalent to the Directive’s standard, or risk a technical non-compli - ance finding. The Directive ’ s further potential impact on prevention obligations The Directive’s requirement for independent special - ised anti-corruption bodies will place Italy’s existing institutional architecture under scrutiny. The Italian National Anti-Corruption Agency ( Agenzia Nazion- ale Anti - Corruzion e – ANAC) currently performs the designated functions for the public sector, though its operational independence and resources have been subject to recurring criticism. The Directive’s requirement that such bodies be adequately resourced and genuinely independent is likely to require a strengthening of ANAC’s statutory mandate and budgetary guarantees. The requirement to publish annual EU-format comparable data on cor - ruption enforcement will also require co-ordination between the Prosecution Office, the Ministry of Jus - tice, ANAC and statisticians. Finally, the Directive’s prevention obligations include the introduction of rules on lobbying transparency – an area where Italy cur - rently lacks comprehensive legislation. Italian Legislative Decree 30 December 2025, No 211, Implementing Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on Sanctions Violations Background and context In recent years, EU restrictive measures – encompass - ing economic, commercial and financial sanctions – have taken on a central role in the EU’s response to geopolitical crises. However, the absence of uniform rules and effective deterrent mechanisms has often made it difficult to ensure compliance and, above all, prevent circumvention. To fill this gap, Directive (EU) 2024/1226, approved in April 2024 (the “Sanctions Directive”), introduced common minimum rules on the definition of offences and penalties for violations of restrictive measures.
124 CHAMBERS.COM
Powered by FlippingBook