Definitive global law guides offering comparative analysis from top-ranked lawyers
CHAMBERS GLOBAL PRACTICE GUIDES
Financial Crime 2026 Definitive global law guides offering comparative analysis from top-ranked lawyers
Contributing Editor Deepak Vij ABV Solicitors
Global Practice Guides
Financial Crime Contributing Editor Deepak Vij ABV Solicitors
2026
Chambers Global Practice Guides For more than 20 years, Chambers Global Guides have ranked lawyers and law firms across the world. Chambers now offer clients a new series of Global Practice Guides, which contain practical guidance on doing legal business in key jurisdictions. We use our knowledge of the world’s best lawyers to select leading law firms in each jurisdiction to write the ‘Law & Practice’ sections. In addition, the ‘Trends & Developments’ sections analyse trends and developments in local legal markets. Disclaimer: The information in this guide is provided for general reference only, not as specific legal advice. Views expressed by the authors are not necessarily the views of the law firms in which they practise. For specific legal advice, a lawyer should be consulted. Content Management Director Claire Oxborrow Content Manager Jonathan Mendelowitz Senior Content Reviewers Sally McGonigal, Ethne Withers, Deborah Sinclair, Stephen Dinkeldein, Vivienne Button and Sean Marshall Content Reviewers Lawrence Garrett, Marianne Page, Heather Palomino, Alison Moore, Adrian Ciechacki and Michael Irvine Content Coordination Manager Nancy Tsang Senior Content Coordinators Carla Cagnina and Delicia Tasinda Content Coordinator Joanna Chivers Head of Production Jasper John Production Coordinator Genevieve Sibayan
Published by Chambers and Partners 165 Fleet Street London EC4A 2AE Tel +44 20 7606 8844 Fax +44 20 7831 5662 Web www.chambers.com
Copyright © 2026 Chambers and Partners
Contents
INTRODUCTION Contributed by Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors p.4
PORTUGAL Law and Practice p.133 Contributed by Rogério Alves & Associados Trends and Developments p.149 Contributed by Rogério Alves & Associados SINGAPORE Law and Practice p.153 Contributed by Sreenivasan Chambers LLC Trends and Developments p.172 Contributed by Sreenivasan Chambers LLC
CROATIA Law and Practice p.15 Contributed by TUS & GRŽIĆ Trends and Developments p.35 Contributed by TUS & GRŽIĆ ENGLAND & WALES Law and Practice p.40 Contributed by Carson Kaye Trends and Developments p.57 Contributed by Carson Kaye FRANCE Trends and Developments p.63 Contributed by Weil & Associés
SPAIN Law and Practice p.178 Contributed by SLJ Abogados
SWITZERLAND Law and Practice p.197 Contributed by Charles Russell Speechlys Switzerland
GREECE Law and Practice p.70
Trends and Developments p.211 Contributed by taormina law AG USA Law and Practice p.217 Contributed by Kasowitz LLP Trends and Developments p.229 Contributed by Kasowitz LLP USA – NEW YORK Trends and Developments p.234 Contributed by Selendy Gay PLLC
Contributed by Machas & Partners Trends and Developments p.88 Contributed by Anagnostopoulos
INDIA Trends and Developments p.94 Contributed by Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co. ITALY Law and Practice p.101 Contributed by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer LLP Trends and Developments p.119 Contributed by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer LLP
POLAND Trends and Developments p.128 Contributed by Fieldfisher Poland
3 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION
Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
ABV Solicitors is highly regarded as a leader in its field for advising and representing individuals and corporations on serious and complex financial crime cases and investigations in the UK. The firm is regu - larly instructed to represent clients both nationally and internationally who are involved in some of the most serious financial crime cases across the coun - try, which include bribery and corruption; cross-bor - der, high-value investment fraud; global money laun -
dering; and asset recovery. It is frequently instructed on the most serious SFO and FCA prosecutions and investigations. Recent work includes advising promi - nent figures, including politically exposed persons across the globe, on high-value asset and account freezing orders and sanctions; high-value, cross-bor - der cryptocurrency fraud; and money laundering; as well as advising large commercial businesses on seri - ous corporate wrongdoing. provide legal advice and assistance to both individuals and corporates nationally and internationally and is consistently instructed in the most significant financial crime cases and investigations in the UK. Deepak has for over a decade been recognised as a Band 1 lawyer in Chambers UK: Regional Financial Crime and as a leading individual in financial crime in other legal directories.
Contributing Editor
Deepak Vij is one of the founding directors of ABV Solicitors and the head of the fraud and complex crime department. Deepak is globally recognised and highly sought after for his expertise in defending and
advising on serious and corporate fraud, bribery and corruption, money laundering, complex crime, asset forfeiture, account freezing orders and compliance/ regulatory matters. He is regularly instructed to
ABV Solicitors The Shipping Building, Old Vinyl Factory, 252-254 Blyth Road, Hayes Middlesex UB3 1HA UK Tel: 0344 587 9996 Email: admin@abvsolicitors.co.uk Web: www.abvsolicitors.co.uk
4 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
Financial Crime: A General Overview I am delighted to present the first edition of the Cham - bers Financial Crime Global Practice Guide. I would like to thank all those who have responded to my questionnaire and for their contributions and articles which have been included in this Guide. In 2026, financial crime will continue to represent a systemic risk at a global level, driven by digitalisa - tion, cross-border payment flows and the increas - ing sophistication of organised criminal networks. According to estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, financial crime and related illicit financial flows account for approximately 2–5% of global GDP, equivalent to between USD2 trillion and USD5 trillion annually. The World Economic Forum has further identified fraud as the single fastest-growing crime type worldwide, outpacing drug trafficking and cyber-dependent crimes in year-on-year growth. Financial crime is consistently evolving and becoming even more sophisticated and difficult to detect. Driven by AI technology, geopolitics and consumer behav - iour, the cost to the global economy is severe. Some estimates suggest financial crime, including money laundering, costs the UK (for example) around GBP14 billion annually. Regulators are now demanding even stronger gov - ernance, accountability and scrutiny for professional institutions and advisers such as banks, lawyers, accountants, fintechs and corporate service provid - ers to assist in combatting financial crime. In addi - tion, new legislation and enforcement have been intro - duced both in the UK and globally to deal with this pervasive crime. This 2026 Chambers Financial Crime Global Practice Guide is devised and drafted to assist those in busi- ness, both individuals and corporations, to navigate this evolving terrain. The Guide has sought analysis and opinion from lead - ing practitioners around the world to provide practi - cal and informative advice in respect of the regulation and enforcement of financial crime and to share their insight into future developments in this area.
It is clear from the analysis compiled that financial crime investigations and enforcement are not globally uniform. Developments in different jurisdictions are not guaranteed to be adopted universally; however, some broad shared issues do exist. Global developments and reforms for combatting financial crime UK A global challenge in recent years has been how the law has developed to combat financial crime. Coun - tries have looked at introducing new legislation in their individual jurisdictions to explore ways to dis - rupt fraudsters. This type of fraud prevention has also become a top priority in the UK. The following is a summary of the efforts the UK is making to combat financial crime. In March 2026, the Government released “Fraud Strategy 2026-2029 Disrupting crime, supporting eco - nomic resilience and delivering justice”. This report, amongst other recommendations, highlights the gov - ernment’s approach to disrupting crime and encour - aging enforcement agencies to support intelligence sharing and collaboration to detect fraud early and to strengthen governance and international partnerships. In addition, in April 2026 the National Crime Agency (NCA) launched a new Online Crime Centre (OCC), alongside the Home Office which connects the data expertise and knowledge of the City of London Police, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Nation - al Cyber Force (NCF) as well as international law enforcement to collaborate and tackle financial crime. The NCA, as part of Operation Machinize, continues its nationwide campaign to crack down on and target cash businesses used as a cover for fraud and money laundering. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) recently announced that it is prioritising enforcement of the “failure to pre - vent fraud” offence under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA), holding large organisations accountable for employee-level fraudulent acts. The Act also introduced measures relating to reforms in identifying crypto-assets and
5 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
relating to money laundering and, most significantly, reforms to Companies House. ECCTA has provided Companies House with the ability to expand its pow - ers to verify directors’ identities, query suspicious fil - ings and strike off dormant and/or fraudulent entities. This has been hailed as the most substantial trans - formation in corporate regulation the UK has seen in decades. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has now become the single supervisor for AML/CTF for pro - fessional services including lawyers and account - ants. The Insolvency Service has also announced its strategy for tackling economic crime by expanding its investigative and prosecutorial functions and working closely with Companies House and HMRC through a referral relationship in co-ordination with the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC). The City of London Police’s Domestic Corruption Unit is piloting state-of-the-art, AI-enabled “corrup - tion investigation assistants” to assist the regional and local police and speed up investigations. These UK domestic reforms coincide with reforms in other jurisdictions across the globe. The trend is famil - iar. Combatting financial crime requires more account - ability and more governance by corporations. USA The USA has always seemed to be at the forefront of legislative reform to tackle financial crime, and other countries have followed suit. Recent reforms include the False Claims Act, which has prioritised financial crime and white-collar crime enforcement, particularly in relation to healthcare fraud, government contracting, tariffs and customs duties. The US administration has prioritised holding company executives and employees accountable for fraud, which is similar to the UK’s “failure to prevent fraud” offence under the ECCTA. The US DOJ has also recently revised its Foreign Cor - rupt Practices Act (FCPA) guidance and amplified its collaboration with its European counterparts through a new task force and its recent accession to the Interna - tional Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre. The FCPA
seeks to target conduct that directly undermines US national interests and to pursue those suspected of bribery “that facilitates the criminal operations of Car - tels and [transnational criminal organisations]”. This extends to potential companies operating in “Territo - ries dominated by Cartels, criminal gangs, and other transnational criminal organisations” that “threaten the erosion of their rule of law and economic growth”. Greece In order to deal with financial crime, Greece has recently updated its legislation to focus on compli - ance, making “obliged entities” report suspicious activities and comply with detailed KYC due diligence to the Anti-Money Laundering Authority. A failure to do so could involve significant fines and even being held liable as an accomplice. Updated legislation in rela - tion to combatting tax evasion has also been a recent priority for this jurisdiction. Portugal Likewise, Portugal has undergone recent develop - ment to its legal framework to align with its European neighbours in respect of the prevention of corruption. Its Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2025–2030 seeks to entrench a culture of transparency and accountability. Its Regime Geral de Prevenção da Corrupção (RGPC) marks a significant advance towards a more co- ordinated and preventive anti-corruption framework, adopting more robust compliance systems. Switzerland Switzerland has also undertaken several significant legislative and reform initiatives in financial crime. The revision of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), which has been under discussion for several years, and is expected to enter into force in the second half of 2026, aims to extend AML obligations to certain non-financial sector activities, including the real estate sector and the advisory services of lawyers. The proposed amendments also seek to strengthen beneficial ownership transparency requirements. The reform process has generated considerable debate within the legal profession, particularly regarding the balance between transparency objectives and profes - sional secrecy.
6 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
Croatia Croatia is also undergoing significant reforms to combat fraud and bribery. It is expected to become a member of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) during the first half of 2026. The OECD is an intergovernmental organisation of 38 member countries committed to democracy and the market economy. Headquartered in Paris, France, its primary mission is to promote policies that improve the economic and social well-being of people world - wide. It operates as a kind of “soft law” regulator, albeit one with a particularly strong practical effect. Its recommendations, guidelines, and conventions, although not always formally binding, create stand - ards whose implementation becomes de facto nec - essary for states seeking full integration into global economic flows. In the field of financial and economic crime, the OECD has developed a normative framework based on sev - eral key principles: • transparency in business and in the public sector; • accountability of legal entities and natural persons; • effective enforcement of criminal legislation; and • international co-operation and exchange of infor - mation Singapore Singapore is also in the midst of legislative changes to combat fraud through major governance reform. This has recently been highlighted following the ongoing trial relating to the Hyflux case. This case involves corporate failure and signals a fundamental shift in the country’s approach to corporate accountability and disclosure enforcement. The legal implications are likely to affect all enterprises operating in Singapore’s capital markets. The legislative reforms are likely to enhance the requirement of proactive compliance, executive accountability and governance evolution. Global investigations and co-operation UK In recent years the UK has surprisingly seen a decline in the number of major global investigations it is involved in.
That said, the SFO has set out its 2026 strategies for tackling global crime which include: • increasing international co-operation and collabo - ration with international law enforcement agencies to investigate more cross-border frauds; • implementing a proactive technology-driven approach and using AI to accelerate investigations and detect early indicators of fraud; • working with the International Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Taskforce, involving the French Financial Prosecutor (PNF) and Swiss Office of the Attorney General, to tackle multi-jurisdictional bribery; and • focusing on investigating crypto-related money laundering and fraud. The above strategy for 2026 seems to suggest that law enforcement agencies in the UK are gearing up for an inevitable rise in global and joint investigations. Only time will tell. USA The USA takes extraterritorial financial crime very seri - ously. US law enforcement has consistently advocated for global co-operation to assist in sharing information with investigators. There are a number of tools to assist them in obtaining such evidence. These include mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) with many countries that provide a formal, binding, and reciprocal mechanism to request testimony, documents, or bank records located in for - eign countries. Authorities may also use letters roga - tory, which are applications to a foreign court seeking judicial assistance. US law enforcement agencies often have agree - ments with their foreign counterparts to share infor - mation and intelligence. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses multilateral and bilateral information sharing agreements – often called “memoranda of understanding” or MOUs – to facilitate consultation and co-operation with its foreign counterparts. These MOUs establish clear guidelines and protocols for exchanging information.
7 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
Under the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act enacted in 2018, US authorities can also compel US-based service providers to produce electronic data (emails and texts) pursuant to a war - rant, even if such data is stored outside of the United
Police co-operation and information exchange are further facilitated through international organisations such as Interpol. Switzerland has signed numerous international trea - ties. International co-operation in criminal matters is principally governed by the Federal Act on Interna - tional Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (IMAC). It provides co-operation measures including the service of documents, taking of evidence, search and seizure, and the freezing and handing over of assets. Swit - zerland also co-operates through INTERPOL and the Egmont Group of financial intelligence units. For the Republic of Croatia, OECD membership rep - resents an additional incentive to strengthen these mechanisms. OECD standards emphasise the importance of: • timely exchange of information; • mutual legal assistance; and • co-ordinated investigations. The rise of aggressive sanctions regimes The current geopolitical crises across the globe con - tinue to influence the need for aggressive sanctions. For businesses, the importance of adhering to sanc - tions obligations has never been so crucial. Failing to abide will result in severe penalties for breaches. In March 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, ECCTA was amended to mirror the US enforcement model and enable the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) to operate on a strict liability basis, meaning it can now penalise companies and individuals for sanctions breaches they may not know they have committed. In March 2024 the EU’s harmonisation of sanctions evasion became a criminal offence across all member states. The UK continues to be a target for foreign corruption networks and a place where regulation has intensified for banks, accountants, lawyers, fintechs and corpo - rate service providers.
States. Europe
Similarly in Portugal, international co-operation in matters of financial crime is based on a framework law on international judicial co-operation in criminal mat - ters. This governs extradition, mutual legal assistance (including searches, seizures, asset freezing, and the gathering of evidence), transfer of proceedings, and the enforcement of criminal judgments, operating in conjunction with Council of Europe conventions, Unit - ed Nations instruments, and European Union instru - ments. Regarding money laundering and terrorist financing, the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Criminal Police ( Polícia Judiciária ) carries out the exchange of infor - mation between Financial Intelligence Units and com - petent authorities of different EU member states, as well as with European co-operative structures such as Eurojust and Europol. Greece also provides for international co-operation in financial crime matters through both EU mechanisms and international agreements. Within the European Union, co-operation is primarily effected through the European Arrest Warrant, which enables simplified and expedited surrender procedures between mem - ber states, as well as instruments of mutual legal assistance and information-sharing (such as the Euro - pean Investigation Order). In addition, co-operation is reinforced through institu - tions such as the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), competent for offences affecting the EU’s financial interests, and agencies addressing organised crime, such as Europol. Beyond the EU, Greece participates in extradition and mutual legal assistance through bilateral and multilat - eral conventions, including the European Convention on Extradition, as well as agreements with third states (eg, the United States and Australia).
8 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
International harmonisation and co-operation Financial crime is a global crisis. The need to detect and investigate cannot just be carried out domestical - ly. Organised crime groups across the globe are evolv - ing and working in tandem on cross-border frauds. This has prompted greater collaboration between states and the sharing of intelligence and conducting joint investigations. Law enforcement agencies from different jurisdictions are now working more closely than ever before. Nations around the world are increasingly reliant on the UK for intelligence to tackle financial crime. An example of this is Operation Chakra-V, a joint inves - tigation launched in 2024 involving the NCA, the FBI, Microsoft, and India’s Central Bureau of Investigation, in which authorities raided a call centre in Noida, India, and arrested a gang responsible for scamming victims in the UK, the USA, and Australia through fake tech support scams. The recent arrests in Nigeria are another example of collaboration between states. In this case it was the UK’s NCA and Nigerian police. The case involved an investment scam using bogus social media accounts to impersonate cryptocurrency traders targeting vic - tims in the UK and USA. Indeed, as mentioned before, UK law enforcement agencies are making it a priority and part of their strat - egy to encourage the international sharing of intel - ligence. The SFO’s 2026 strategy includes actively collaborating with international taskforces for cross- border investigations. It seems that all nations are harmonising their laws and adhering to the standards of international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) The use of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) has become ever more popular across the globe. The USA first introduced them in the 1990s. It took over 20 years for the UK to follow suit when they were intro - duced under Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
There is now a closer co-operation between authori - ties worldwide who share the use of intelligence sources in relation to sanctions enforcement; more so in light of current conflicts. Cybercrime and cryptocurrency We now exist in a largely borderless digital world. The rise in cryptocurrency-related fraud is both complex and profound across the globe. The need to tackle this pandemic is at the forefront of policy in all coun - tries and has led to new legislation and enforcement controls. The UK has seen a spate of landmark rulings that now identify cryptocurrency as property. The rulings also made headway in establishing the location of crypto - currency within a court’s jurisdiction and place great - er obligations on crypto exchanges to identify those involved in crypto-fraud. The UK is taking cryptocurrency fraud seriously. So much so that last year the UK government set out draft legislation: the Financial Services & Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) Regulation 2025. This is set to become a statutory instrument by 2027. The FCA recently secured a conviction against a person oper - ating illegal cryptocurrency ATMs. There are likely to be more investigations and convictions relating to this type of fraud. Indeed, it is clear that crypto is now firmly within the UK’s regulated sector. Similarly, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC have also increased enforcement action such as the recent case of the failed crypto exchange FTX. Last year the USA passed its first cryptocurrency legislation, namely the GENIUS Act. This sought to establish the legitimacy of cryptocurrency and global tokenisation. The USA has also prioritised, under the False Claims Act, procurement and government contracting cases where, among other things, contractors are being targeted for failing to meet cybersecurity require - ments. The recent prosecution of the Nightwing Group involved a failure to implement adequate cybersecu - rity controls.
9 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
A DPA is an agreement reached between a prosecu - tor and an organisation which could be prosecuted, under the supervision of a judge. The agreement allows a prosecution to be suspended for a defined period, provided the organisation meets certain speci - fied conditions. DPAs can be used for fraud, bribery and other economic crime. They apply to organisa - tions, never individuals. The key features of DPAs are that they: • enable a corporate body to make full reparation for criminal behaviour without the collateral damage of a conviction; • are concluded under the supervision of a judge, who must be convinced that the DPA is “in the interests of justice” and that the terms are “fair, reasonable and proportionate”; • avoid lengthy and costly trials; and • are transparent, public events. UK To date, the SFO has entered into 13 DPAs, but none since the 2023 agreement between the Crown Pros - ecution Service and Entain plc for a failure to prevent bribery. The corporation agreed to pay over GBP615 million in reparation over a four-year period. The benefits of DPAs to resolve corporate misconduct liability have made them attractive to other nations. USA In the USA, the government may decline or defer prosecution after considering the evidence relevant to the financial crime. While the circumstances of a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement are case-specific, the government typically enters into these agreements where the defendant has voluntarily and promptly disclosed its misconduct, co-operated with the government’s investigation, and engaged in remedial steps. Europe France was inspired to introduce the Convention Judi- ciaire d’Intérêt Public , which is a similar model to the DPA and concluded its first one in 2017. Singapore did the same when they introduced the Criminal Justice
Act in the same year, with Canada, Japan and Argen - tina following suit. Following the introduction in Singapore of the Crimi - nal Justice Act, financial crime plea discussions may occur between the accused and the public prosecutor, but any private “plea agreements” are not specifically enforceable. Deferred or non-prosecution agreements are available in certain circumstances but extremely rare. In Portugal there is a similar provision to a DPA. A central instrument of consensual resolution is the provisional suspension of proceedings ( suspensão provisória do processo ), whereby the public prosecu - tor proposes the suspension, subject to the defend - ant’s acceptance of certain obligations - such as payments or regularisation measures – with the agree - ment of both the injured party and the judge. Upon full compliance with such obligations, the proceedings are ultimately discontinued. However, recourse to this mechanism is only permissible at the early stages of criminal proceedings and only in respect of offences punishable with no more than five years’ imprison - ment. In offences such as corruption, embezzlement, and money laundering, provisions of a “reward-based” nature exist, whereby decisive co-operation with the authorities and the restitution of illicit advantages may result in a waiver of penalty or significant mitigation. Although there is no broad system of plea bargaining, the combination of mechanisms, such as regularisa - tion, co-operation, provisional suspension, and waiver or mitigation of penalties, effectively enables negoti - ated solutions and significant reductions in sanctions within the Portuguese legal system. In Greece, however, DPAs are not available. Criminal negotiation (Article 303 of the Code of Criminal Proce - dure) may be initiated upon request of the defendant or at the initiative of the prosecutor at any stage prior to the commencement of the evidentiary proceedings before the trial court, in exchange for a confession and a reduced sentence. The relevant agreement is drawn up in writing and must be ratified by the court. If no agreement is reached, the criminal proceedings con - tinue from the stage at which they were interrupted, and any written request by the defendant or invitation
10 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
by the prosecutor is destroyed and cannot be used against the defendant. Time will tell whether legisla - tive reforms provide for DPAs in Greece in the future. Similarly, Switzerland does not have deferred pros - ecution agreements or non-prosecution agreements under its domestic law. Although the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland proposed introduc - ing a DPA-like mechanism during the 2022 revision of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Federal Council rejected the proposal. At present there is no statutory framework allowing prosecutors to enter into negoti - ated settlement agreements with companies or indi - viduals in exchange for compliance undertakings or monitorship arrangements. Self-reporting and whistle-blowers Corporations are incentivised to enter into DPAs to avoid criminal prosecution. To benefit from such agreements, they must have effective self-reporting and whistle-blowing procedures in place. Addition - ally, conducting a robust internal investigation is of paramount importance. UK The SFO’s revised Corporate Cooperation Guidance published in April 2025 gave a clear assurance that DPA negotiations will follow prompt self-reporting “unless exceptional circumstances apply”. Whistle- blowing in the UK is a procedure for the reporting of workplace wrongdoing such as fraud or other legal breaches which are in the public interest. Whistle-blowers are protected from dismissal or detri - ment under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 if they make a “qualifying disclosure” to their employer, a regulator, or other prescribed bodies. Many commentators have advocated for the introduc - tion of incentive arrangements for whistle-blowers in the UK. The UK Government has now acknowledged this and in its Anti-Corruption Strategy, published in December 2025, there is a commitment to explor - ing the viability of these arrangements. HMRC have recently explored a Strengthened Reward Scheme which may provide a template for how such a scheme could operate in the UK.
Any financial incentive is likely to increase the num - ber of whistle-blowers coming forward. This scheme will no doubt also lead to more disclosures of corpo - rate wrongdoing, but this may also come with its own issues. USA The USA has used this whistle-blowing provision for a while and have in place a very attractive financial incentive for whistle-blowers to come forward. In 2024, DOJ’s Criminal Division introduced a Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (the “Whistle - blower Program”) designed to incentivise tips from whistle-blowers to uncover corporate crime. Under the programme, any whistle-blower that provides the Criminal Division with original and truthful information about corporate misconduct that results in a success - ful forfeiture of assets may be eligible for an award. Thus, the bargain is simple – if the whistle-blower reports corporate misconduct, and the tip results in a prosecution and forfeiture, then the whistle-blower may receive a financial award. The programme permits the whistle-blower to submit his or her tip anonymously through a lawyer. How - ever, even if a whistle-blower reports conduct with - out a lawyer – and is thus required to disclose his or her identity to DOJ – there are assurances that DOJ will protect the confidentiality of the whistle-blower except as required by law or some other compelling need or interest. In May 2025, DOJ expanded the Whistleblower Pro - gram, which was first created in 2024, to broaden the array of offences eligible for awards. While the original pilot programme covered financial institution crimes, foreign bribery, domestic bribery and kickbacks, and healthcare offences, the expanded programme now encompasses procurement and federal programme fraud, trade and customs fraud, federal immigration violations, and support for foreign terrorist organisa - tions, cartels, and transnational criminal organisations. Unsurprisingly, these additional offences eligible for an award under the programme directly reflect the pri - orities of the current administration. This expansion appears to have yielded fruitful results. In September 2025, DOJ reported that since the expansion, it had
11 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
received 313 tips and found that 120 of them war - ranted additional investigation, “including a number of tips relating to priority areas – procurement fraud, trade fraud, and sanctions evasion”. While DOJ’s FCPA guidance may explain part of the diminished FCPA enforcement activity, another DOJ policy appears to have had a material impact on the disposition of FCPA cases, particularly for corpora - tions under investigation. In June 2025, DOJ’s Crimi - nal Division issued a revised Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP) designed to streamline the charging cal - culus in cases involving companies. By and large, the CEP offered potential benefits to companies that: • voluntarily self-disclosed misconduct; • fully co-operated with DOJ’s investigation; and • timely and appropriately remediated. While prior iterations of the CEP created a presump - tion of a declination if a company satisfied these requirements, the revised version requires a declina - tion. DOJ is also likely to tap into a fertile source of informa - tion from the Whistleblower Program to fuel its surge of False Claims Act enforcement. Greece In Greece, in cases involving bribery of public officials, political figures or members of the judiciary, as well as trading in influence and related offences, a person may be granted whistle-blower (public interest wit - ness) status, provided that they are not involved in the offence and do not seek any personal benefit. This status is granted by financial crime prosecutors, with the approval of the Head Prosecutor, where the indi - vidual provides information that significantly contrib - utes to the detection and prosecution of the offence. The law provides protective measures for such whis - tle-blowers, including confidentiality, and in some cas - es, immunity from prosecution, in order to encourage reporting without fear of retaliation. Portugal In Portugal, both general and sector-specific frame - works establish the existence of mandatory internal
and external whistle-blowing channels, which must ensure confidentiality and anonymity. These regimes also provide for a strict prohibition of retaliation against whistle-blowers, accompanied by significant administrative sanctions in the event of breach. Fur - thermore, in many legal frameworks (eg, under Law No 93/2021, the Securities Code and anti-money laundering legislation), whistle-blowers benefit from immunity or exemption from liability where reports are made in good faith. In certain contexts, particularly under the Securities Code, there is also a presump - tion that any detrimental measures adopted following a report constitute retaliation. As regards incentives, these are essentially of a nega - tive or protective nature, consisting primarily in the prohibition of retaliation, immunity from liability, and procedural support mechanisms. Although, in areas such as auditing, European Union law allows mem - ber states to establish incentive schemes for internal whistle-blowers, there does not appear to be, under Portuguese law, a generalised regime providing for financial rewards or bonuses. Anonymous reporting is expressly permitted. Mecha - nisms for anonymous reporting exist both internally within organisations – under Law No 93/2021, anti- money laundering frameworks, and regulatory notices issued by Bank of Portugal – and externally, through competent authorities such as the Portuguese Securi - ties Market Commission, Bank of Portugal, and other sectoral regulators, in accordance with the applicable legal regimes. Switzerland Switzerland currently lacks comprehensive legisla - tion protecting whistle-blowers in the private sector. Multiple legislative proposals have been rejected by Parliament, most recently in 2024 when the National Council again voted against a new whistle-blower proposal. As a result, the measures whistle-blowers may take to report misconduct and the circumstances under which they may report externally have been estab - lished primarily through case law.
12 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
Under Articles 321a(1) and 321a(4) of the Code of Obligations (CO), employees owe a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to their employer, meaning they must generally report misconduct internally first. Only if internal reporting is exhausted and a public interest concern exists may an employee escalate to authori - ties, and disclosure to the media is permitted only as a last resort. Whistle-blowers who breach these obligations risk criminal prosecution – for example, under Articles 162 SCC (business secrecy) or 47 of the Banking Act (banking secrecy) as well as dismissal. While termination solely for lodging a complaint may constitute unfair dismissal, the remedy is limited to compensation of up to six months’ salary, with no right of reinstatement. Switzerland offers no financial incentives for whistle- blowers comparable to programmes in the United States. However, anonymous reporting mechanisms do exist. In 2015, the Swiss Federal Audit Office launched an anonymous electronic reporting platform allowing the public to report suspicions of corruption, or fraud with guaranteed anonymity. Private entities are not legally required to establish whistle-blowing systems, though doing so is consid - ered best practice and may be implicitly expected under corporate governance obligations. The OECD has repeatedly urged Switzerland to adopt stronger protections for private-sector whistle-blowers. Singapore In Singapore, protection for whistle-blowers is pro - vided through a combination of statutory provisions and regulatory guidance. Under Section 36 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, complaints made to the authorities cannot be admit - ted as evidence in civil or criminal proceedings, and no witness is required or permitted to disclose the identity of an informer. The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act also imposes reporting obligations on persons who know or sus - pect that property is linked to criminal conduct. Good
faith disclosures to a Suspicious Transaction Report - ing Office (STRO) are protected from civil or criminal liability and do not constitute a breach of confidential - ity obligations. In addition, the Code of Corporate Governance encourages listed companies to implement whistle- blowing policies that allow employees to report con - cerns confidentially. While there is no general statutory guarantee of ano - nymity, reporting channels (including submissions to an STRO and reports to the Corrupt Practices Inves - tigation Bureau) are structured to protect the identity of informants in practice. Enforcing anti-money laundering laws The global need to prevent and detect money launder - ing is paramount. Financial criminals and fraudsters need to launder the proceeds of their crime. The UK has made this a top priority. In response to the threat of money laundering, ECCTA includes provi - sions relating to Companies House reform aimed at improving corporate transparency, as well as meas - ures concerning the seizure and recovery of crypto- assets, intelligence sharing, and proactive intelligence gathering by law enforcement agencies. Last year the government produced its proposals for improving the effectiveness of the UK Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLRs). Other nations have all adopted a similar approach. In April 2024, the EU, in an effort to combat money laundering and terrorist financing provided Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) with more powers to analyse and detect money laundering and suspend suspicious transactions. This includes enhanced due diligence measures and checks on customers’ identities. In addition, the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism has been created to ensure that EU anti-money laundering rules are applied correctly and consistently.
13 CHAMBERS.COM
INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Deepak Vij, ABV Solicitors
In conclusion Financial crime is a global epidemic. It has been and remains a threat to the integrity of the world’s corpo - rate and financial system. The year-on-year growth rate of the losses associated is colossal. The illicit proceeds are globally laundered to fund further crimes including terrorist financing and human trafficking. Financial crime is industrialised and global. Criminals are innovative, adopting and enhancing the effective - ness of their fraudulent schemes via technological advances such as AI to exploit the financial system for their own gain and at a pace at which funds have dis - appeared through faster digitalised payment channels and moved across borders even before detection. These technological advances have reshaped the global financial crime landscape, making financial crime more difficult to combat and more lucrative for the criminal enterprises. It seems that the global consensus to combat financial crime is to: • continue to develop legal frameworks and to try to harmonise with other jurisdictions; • expand enforcement and make international co- operation and collaboration with law enforcement agencies easier; • have mechanisms in place such as DPAs and whis - tle-blowing provisions with incentives to encourage disclosure of corporate wrongdoing;
• make compliance and governance including risk assessment mandatory for corporate, legal and financial institutions to prevent or make it difficult for the criminal enterprises to exploit the financial system; • provide law enforcement agencies globally with the tools and resources to investigate and to detect financial crimes as early as possible to mitigate losses and to also be able to recover the proceeds of crime and use sanctions when necessary; • invest in and utilise technological advances and AI to prevent, detect and mitigate financial crime. This final point, however, presents both opportunities and challenges. While AI promises faster detection and improved risk assessment, it is of concern to all to ensure that its use remains explainable, unbiased and supported by adequate human oversight. The 2026 edition of the Chambers Financial Crime Global Practice Guide has been written to ensure that practitioners are equipped to manage all aspects of financial crime in the jurisdictions in which they oper - ate and are able to advise their clients accordingly. The Chambers Global Financial Crime Guide provides both assistance and insight to those who operate in the corporate sector. It is an informative resource that focuses on and explains the key issues that are faced at all stages of an investigation.
14 CHAMBERS.COM
CROATIA Law and Practice Contributed by: Ivan Gržić TUS & GRŽIĆ
Austria
Hungary
Croatia Zagreb
Slovenia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Italy
Contents 1. Legal Framework and General Principles p.17 1.1 Scope of Financial Crime and General Criminal Law Principles p.17 1.2 Burden and Standard of Proof p.17 1.3 Aiding and Abetting p.17 1.4 Limitation Periods p.18 1.5 Extraterritorial Reach and Cross-Border Co-Operation p.18 1.6 Extradition and Prohibited Destinations p.19 2. Enforcement Architecture p.19 2.1 Investigative and Enforcement Authorities p.19 2.2 Initiation of Investigations p.20 2.3 Investigatory Powers p.20 2.4 Use of Technology and Data p.21 2.5 Internal Investigations and Co-Operation p.21 2.6 Right to Not Co-Operate or Self-Incriminate p.22 2.7 Pre-Charge Powers p.22 3. Core Financial Crime Offences p.23 3.1 Fraud and Dishonesty Offences p.23 3.2 Bribery and Corruption p.24 3.3 Money Laundering p.24 3.4 Financial Services Crime p.25 3.5 Tax Evasion and Financial Reporting p.25 3.6 Cartels and Anti-Competitive Offences p.26 3.7 Counterfeiting p.26 3.8 Greenwashing and Environmental Pollution Violations p.27 4. Prosecution and Trial Process p.27
5. Corporate Liability, Compliance and Defences p.29 5.1 Corporate and Individual Liability p.29 5.2 Compliance Programmes p.30 5.3 Defences and Exceptions p.30 5.4 Whistle-Blower Protection p.30
6. Resolutions, Sanctions and Remedies p.31 6.1 Prosecution and Resolution Mechanisms p.31
6.2 Sanctions and Sentencing p.31 6.3 Proceeds of Crime Recovery p.32
6.4 Victim Compensation and Asset Recovery p.32 7. Enforcement Priorities and Case Law Developments p.33 7.1 Enforcement Priorities p.33 7.2 Recent Case Law and Latest Developments p.33
4.1 Initiating a Prosecution p.27 4.2 Due Process and Bail p.28 4.3 Public or State Funding p.28 4.4 Venue and Specialisation p.29 4.5 Trial by Jury p.29
15 CHAMBERS.COM
CROATIA Law and Practice Contributed by: Ivan Gržić, TUS & GRŽIĆ
TUS & GRŽIĆ is a Croatian law firm based in Zagreb, with a team of five lawyers and trainee lawyers focus - ing on corporate, commercial and financial law, as well as economic and business criminal law, includ - ing non-violent criminal offences. The firm advises and represents domestic and international clients, in - cluding companies, board members and individuals, in complex matters before all courts and authorities in the Republic of Croatia, as well as in cases involv - ing cross-border elements through co-operation with
foreign counsel. Its work in this practice area includes defence and representation in high-profile economic crime proceedings, regulatory and financial investi - gations, as well as advisory work at the intersection of corporate transactions and criminal liability. Re - cent work includes the representation of high-profile clients, including former political office holders, in some of the most prominent criminal proceedings in the Republic of Croatia concerning alleged economic and business crime. through a well-established network of international contacts with renowned law firms and attorneys, and facilitating legal assistance in foreign jurisdictions. He frequently participates in prestigious international conferences and congresses and is a full member of the International Association of Lawyers (UIA), serving on the Human Rights Commission, and a qualified World Justice Project collaborator.
Author
Ivan Gržić is a founder of Tus & Gržić. By choosing a law career, Ivan has continued a family tradition dating to 1963. As a criminal defence attorney, Ivan acts as counsel in high-profile and prominent criminal cases in
Croatia, particularly focusing on economic and white-collar crime. Ivan regularly advises clients from Croatia and abroad, providing legal support
TUS & GRŽIĆ Ulica Baruna Trenka 5 10000 Zagreb Croatia Tel: +385 1581 1756 Email: info@tus-grzic.hr Web: www.tus-grzic.hr
16 CHAMBERS.COM
CROATIA Law and Practice Contributed by: Ivan Gržić, TUS & GRŽIĆ
1. Legal Framework and General Principles 1.1 Scope of Financial Crime and General Criminal Law Principles In the Croatian legal system, “financial crime” is not legally defined. It is a descriptive term used to denote offences affecting property, financial or economic interests, often involving complex transactions or abuse of trust. It particularly includes: • property offences (eg, fraud – Article 236; abuse of trust in business – Article 246); • corruption offences (eg, bribery – Articles 293– 294); • money laundering (Article 265); • offences against the economy and financial system (Chapter XXIV); • tax offences (eg, tax evasion – Article 256); • capital market offences (eg, market abuse – Article 260 in conjunction with the Capital Market Act/EU Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)); • violations of international sanctions; and • cyber-enabled property offences (Chapter XXV; eg, computer fraud – Article 271). A financial crime exists where the following elements are met: • an act or omission; • unlawfulness; • culpability; and • statutory definition. Typical elements include: • conduct (eg, deception, concealment); • consequence (pecuniary damage or unlawful gain); • causation; and • subjective element (fault). Liability generally requires intent (direct/indirect) or negligence; most financial crimes require intent, while negligent offences are rarer. Attempts are punishable if the offence carries more than five years’ imprisonment or where law expressly allows. Attempt liability exists for serious financial
crimes. Participation includes incitement and aiding/ abetting (Articles 37–39). Criminal association (Article 328) addresses organised crime; Croatia does not rec - ognise Anglo-Saxon “conspiracy”, but similar func - tions are served. Legal persons may be criminally liable under the Criminal Liability of Legal Persons Act (CLPA), which governs conditions, penalties, confiscation, seizure, publication of judgments, limitation periods and pro - cedure. 1.2 Burden and Standard of Proof The presumption of innocence and the burden of proof are governed by the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) and the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty by a final judgment. Under Article 3 (2) CPA/08, the burden of proving guilt lies with the prosecutor. The suspect or accused is not required to prove their innocence and has the right to remain silent. The standard of proof for conviction is “beyond rea - sonable doubt”, and in case of doubt, in dubio pro reo applies. Limited presumptions exist in specific contexts, such as confiscation of criminal proceeds or money laundering, but the prosecutor must always prove the offence and guilt. Liability requires fault (intent or negligence), while strict liability is generally Under the Criminal Code, a person may be held crimi - nally liable as a participant if they knowingly take part in the commission of an offence by another perpetra - tor. Participation includes, in particular: • co-perpetration (Article 36 of the Criminal Code), where a person commits an offence alone or through another person; • incitement (Article 37) – ie, inducing another person to commit an offence; and • aiding and abetting (Article 38) – ie, facilitating the commission of an offence by providing advice, means, removing obstacles or otherwise assisting. limited to misdemeanours. 1.3 Aiding and Abetting
17 CHAMBERS.COM
Page i Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 Page 11 Page 12 Page 13 Page 14 Page 15 Page 16 Page 17 Page 18 Page 19 Page 20 Page 21 Page 22 Page 23 Page 24 Page 25 Page 26 Page 27 Page 28 Page 29 Page 30 Page 31 Page 32 Page 33 Page 34 Page 35 Page 36 Page 37 Page 38 Page 39 Page 40 Page 41 Page 42 Page 43 Page 44 Page 45 Page 46 Page 47 Page 48 Page 49 Page 50 Page 51 Page 52 Page 53 Page 54 Page 55 Page 56 Page 57 Page 58 Page 59 Page 60 Page 61 Page 62 Page 63 Page 64 Page 65 Page 66 Page 67 Page 68 Page 69 Page 70 Page 71 Page 72 Page 73 Page 74 Page 75 Page 76 Page 77 Page 78 Page 79 Page 80 Page 81 Page 82 Page 83 Page 84 Page 85 Page 86 Page 87 Page 88 Page 89 Page 90 Page 91 Page 92 Page 93 Page 94 Page 95 Page 96 Page 97 Page 98 Page 99 Page 100 Page 101 Page 102 Page 103 Page 104 Page 105 Page 106 Page 107 Page 108 Page 109 Page 110 Page 111 Page 112 Page 113 Page 114 Page 115 Page 116 Page 117 Page 118 Page 119 Page 120 Page 121 Page 122 Page 123 Page 124 Page 125 Page 126 Page 127 Page 128 Page 129 Page 130 Page 131 Page 132 Page 133 Page 134 Page 135 Page 136 Page 137 Page 138 Page 139 Page 140 Page 141 Page 142 Page 143 Page 144 Page 145 Page 146 Page 147 Page 148 Page 149 Page 150 Page 151 Page 152 Page 153 Page 154 Page 155 Page 156 Page 157 Page 158 Page 159 Page 160 Page 161 Page 162 Page 163 Page 164 Page 165 Page 166 Page 167 Page 168 Page 169 Page 170 Page 171 Page 172 Page 173 Page 174 Page 175 Page 176 Page 177 Page 178 Page 179 Page 180 Page 181 Page 182 Page 183 Page 184 Page 185 Page 186 Page 187 Page 188 Page 189 Page 190 Page 191 Page 192 Page 193 Page 194 Page 195 Page 196 Page 197 Page 198 Page 199Powered by FlippingBook