SERBIA Trends and Developments Contributed by: Stevan Pajović, Tamara Simić Pajović, Medo Zornić and Jelena Stoljiljković, T-S Legal
of producing multimodal outputs. This convergence intensifies the legal uncertainty, as the boundary between “tool” and “creator” becomes increasingly blurred. Legal framework and the requirement of human authorship Given that generative AI creates completely new con- tent that is difficult to attribute to the intellectual work of a specific natural person, whether the developer of the AI system, the author of the work that was used for its training, or the user who initiated the creation pro- cess through prompts, the question arises as to how such content should be situated within the current system of copyright protection. More specifically, for the purpose of this discussion, the question is whether AI can be considered the author of a film. This ambiguity is at the heart of contemporary copy- right debates. Unlike traditional creative processes where authorship can be traced through a relatively linear sequence of human decisions, AI-generated outputs emerge from complex interactions between training data, algorithmic architecture, and user input. Each of these elements contributes in some way to the final result, yet none alone fully explains or con- trols it. The answer to this question can be found in the Law on Copyright and Related Rights of the Republic of Serbia, specifically in Article 2, which defines the concept of copyrighted work, and Article 9, which determines who may be regarded as the author of the work. In other words, it is first necessary to deter- mine whether the content created by AI is subject to copyright, and only if the answer is affirmative, who is to be regarded as the author of that work. Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights defines copyrighted work as the origi- nal intellectual creation of the author, expressed in a certain form, regardless of its artistic, scientific or other value, its purpose, size, content and manner of expression, as well as the permissibility of publicly communicating its content. Therefore, in order for a work to be copyrighted, it must represent the original spiritual expression of the
author, an expression of their personality, creation, state of mind, ie, intellect. Originality and spiritual- ity are two sides of the same coin since originality is defined by the representation of the author’s per- sonality. Already at this first stage, AI has failed to meet this requirement, given that the content it gener- ates cannot represent an expression of its personality (because this is a quality it does not possess), nor its own spiritual creation, at least until the such a time when AI becomes “real” intelligence or a self-aware entity capable of representing “itself” through its work. This requirement of personality expression has his- torically served as a safeguard ensuring that copy- right protects human intellectual labour rather than mechanical reproduction. However, AI challenges this assumption by producing outputs that appear original without possessing subjective experience or inten- tion. The law is therefore forced to consider whether “originality” must always be tied to consciousness or whether functional creativity may be sufficient. The legislator is also aware of this issue; accordingly, Article 9 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights stipulates that an author is a natural person who cre- ated the copyrighted work. Therefore, only a natural person can express their intellectual or spiritual state in a certain form, ie, only a natural person can create a copyrighted work. AI is not a natural person, and in accordance with current regulations, it will not be considered the author of the content it has generated. Considering that AI is not even a legal entity and that the question of responsibility for the damage caused by it acting autonomously in accordance with its own programming and purpose could potentially be raised, the European Parliament is considering the possibility of introducing a third category of persons, so-called “electronic persons”, which would include robots and AI. Authorship challenges in AI-generated works The proposal of “electronic personality” reflects an attempt to bridge the gap between traditional legal categories and emerging technological realities. How- ever, such proposals remain controversial, as they risk attributing legal agency to systems that lack moral responsibility, consciousness, or intent. Critics argue
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