CHILE Trends and Developments Contributed by: Julio Pellegrini, Fernando Zuñiga and Bernardo Aylwin, Pellegrini y Rencoret
not capable of settlement by arbitration under Chilean law; or (vi) the award is in conflict with Chilean public policy. The Court has long maintained that its role in annul - ment challenges must be narrowly circumscribed, with its intervention strictly limited to the grounds expressly provided under Article 34 (see Case No 9.317-2007). Anchored in the doctrine of minimal intervention, this approach has contributed to Chile’s unique standing in Latin America: to the authors’ knowledge, it remains the only jurisdiction in the region where no annulment action against an international commercial arbitral award has been successful. Moreover, the Chilean judiciary has upheld the consti - tutionality of the restrictive regime for judicial review enshrined in Article 34, insofar as the IAA establishes that annulment is the sole available mechanism for challenging an international arbitral award. Conse - quently, Chilean courts have consistently rejected attempts to circumvent this exclusivity by invoking procedural remedies other than the annulment action. In affirming the legitimacy of this limitation, the Con - stitutional Court has stated: “Such restriction [annul - ment as the sole remedy] does not infringe the Con - stitution but rather constitutes a legitimate exercise of procedural design powers, aimed at safeguarding the efficiency and expediency of arbitration” ( Fimer SpA v Enel Green Power Chile S.A. , Docket No 15.144-2024, decision dated 31 January 2025). In the decisions under review, the Court continues to treat these principles as the doctrinal baseline for its analysis in annulment proceedings. In each case examined, the Court began by reaf - firming the principle of minimal judicial intervention enshrined in Article 5 of the IAA. According to the Court, this principle requires that the annulment action be regarded as an exceptional remedy, governed by strict and exhaustive grounds. As such, the causes for setting aside an award “are founded upon limited and narrowly defined grounds, which do not permit broad, purposive, or analogical interpretation” ( Republic of Ecuador ).
The Court further interprets the principle of minimal intervention as a substantive limitation on the scope of judicial review, emphasising that, when adjudicat - ing an annulment request, “the reviewing court is pre - cluded from revisiting the merits of the decision, as the grounds for annulment are confined to verifying compliance with minimum standards of legality” (see CELEC and Republic of Ecuador ). In this context, the Chilean judiciary continues to affirm its deferential posture toward arbitral awards rendered in international proceedings, treating the award as the analytical point of departure in annulment proceed - ings and refraining from second-guessing the tribu - nal’s substantive determinations. The Court Affirms That Annulment is Strictly Limited to Exhaustive Procedural Grounds and Precludes Substantive Review In the cases reviewed, the Court reiterates that the grounds for annulment under the IAA are confined exclusively to procedural or formal irregularities and do not authorise substantive review of the arbitral tribunal’s reasoning or conclusions. These decisions consistently characterise the annulment mechanism as a procedural safeguard designed to protect “funda - mental procedural guarantees” (see Empresa Pública de Hidrocarburos del Ecuador and Worley Internation- al Services ), not as a vehicle for correcting perceived errors in fact-finding or legal interpretation. In assessing compliance with these procedural standards, the Court has developed what has been described as a principle of presumptive validity or institutional legitimacy of arbitral awards, whereby the burden falls squarely on the applicant to establish – clearly and specifically – the existence of a qualifying ground for annulment (see Case No 11.466-2015 and CELEC ). In practical terms, this has translated into a consistent pattern of judicial restraint, with the Court focusing narrowly on whether the award is tainted by “serious procedural irregularities” (Case No 1.971- 2012) and declining to engage in any assessment of its merits. The case law analysed reflects a coherent application of this standard. For instance, in Republic of Ecuador , the state alleged that the arbitral tribunal had ruled on
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