FRANCE Trends and Developments Contributed by: Christophe Ingrain, Paul Mallet, Isaac Arnoud and Arthur Teisseire, Darrois Villey Maillot & Brochier
techniques may influence investigative practices in other areas, including financial and corporate crimi - nal proceedings. Parliamentary Oversight and White-Collar Crime Proceedings: The Growing Role – and Risks – of Investigative Commissions In recent years, parliamentary commissions of inquiry have become an increasingly frequent tool for politi - cal oversight in France. In this regard, 136 have been recorded since 1958, including 73 between 2008 and 2025 alone. Initially designed to investigate matters relating to public services or private companies, these commis - sions have increasingly ventured into areas tradition - ally reserved for the judiciary. This expansion raises significant concerns about procedural fairness and the separation of powers. Under the 1958 Ordinance on the Functioning of Par - liamentary Commissions, these bodies have substan- tial investigative powers, including the ability to sum - mon witnesses under oath, with refusal to answer a question being punishable by up to two years’ impris - onment and EUR7,500 fines. However, unlike judicial procedures, there is no specific legislative provision granting a person summoned before a parliamentary commission of inquiry any special rights: as a result, they have no right to silence, no access to the case file, no ability to confront witnesses, and no effective presumption of innocence. One of the few safeguards provided by the 1958 ordi - nance is found in Articles 5bis and 6, which stipulate that a parliamentary commission of inquiry cannot be created for matters that have already given rise to judicial proceedings, and as long as such proceed - ings are ongoing. If a commission has already been established, its mandate ends as soon as a judicial investigation is opened into the same facts. However, this text does not provide any safeguards in cases where the facts under investigation by the commission are still part of a preliminary inquiry but have not yet resulted in a judicial investigation. Similarly, it does not address situations where criminal proceedings have already been concluded, such as in cases of dismiss -
al, a final judgment, or the conclusion of a Convention Judiciaire d’Intérêt Public (CJIP). This gap in procedural safeguards becomes particu - larly problematic in such cases. This issue is not only procedural but also affects the fairness of the pro - cess, as it blurs the distinction between judicial justice and political accountability, which can lead to situa - tions where individuals or legal entities are subjected to public trials without the full protection of criminal procedural rights. The risks are compounded by the intense media scrutiny that accompanies such hear - ings, leading to reputational harm that cannot be miti - gated by legal recourse. The Paris Court of Appeal recently ruled, on 14 Novem - ber 2024, that parliamentary commissions of inquiry do not meet the procedural safeguards required in criminal cases, particularly in a case where an indi - vidual was heard by a parliamentary commission while a preliminary inquiry into the same facts was ongo - ing. The court found that these hearings, particularly because they were conducted under oath, violated the rights of the defence and the right against self-incrim - ination. Consequently, the court ordered that these hearings be removed from the criminal proceedings. The Nestlé Waters case also illustrates the risks of the overlap between criminal proceedings and par - liamentary commissions on the same facts. In early 2024, media investigations uncovered that Nestlé Waters had allegedly used unauthorised purifica - tion techniques and illegal water extraction methods, violating environmental standards for bottled spring water. In response, judicial authorities concluded a Convention judiciaire d’intérêt public environnemen- tale (CJIPe) with Nestlé Waters Supply Est, a sub - sidiary of the multinational company, on 2 September 2024, a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA)-type mechanism introduced in France by the Sapin II law and later extended to environmental offences. Under the agreement, Nestlé Waters Supply Est agreed to pay a EUR2 million public interest fine, finance EUR1.1 million in ecological restoration works, and compensate environmental and consumer protec - tion associations for moral damages. This settlement ended the criminal proceedings without conviction.
69 CHAMBERS.COM
Powered by FlippingBook