FRANCE Trends and Developments Contributed by: Christophe Ingrain, Paul Mallet, Isaac Arnoud and Arthur Teisseire, Darrois Villey Maillot & Brochier
However, just months later, a parliamentary commis - sion was created to investigate “industrial practices in the bottled water sector and the responsibilities of public authorities in monitoring these activities”, with Nestlé’s executives being summoned to testify pub - licly, even though the company had already settled its criminal responsibility through the CJIPe. This situation exemplifies the legal and ethical para - dox at the heart of these new dynamics. A corporation that had already fulfilled its obligations under a judi - cial agreement found itself once again questioned in a quasi-judicial setting that lacked the procedural safe - guards of a criminal trial. The highly publicised hear - ings raised concerns about duplicating accountability mechanisms and the politicisation of matters already resolved judicially. For many legal professionals, this case highlights the risks of blurring the line between legal closure and political persistence, undermining both the predictability of corporate enforcement and the legitimacy of parliamentary control. The growing use of parliamentary commissions to question individuals or entities after judicial proceed - ings have concluded presents serious challenges. It risks turning what should be a tool for oversight into an arena for political grandstanding, bypassing the rights of the defence and the fundamental principles of justice. This dynamic requires careful reflection, especially as it impacts the future of corporate crimi - nal law and the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches. Reforming Environmental CJIPs: Balancing Transparency, Accountability and Effectiveness In the aftermath of the Nestlé case, on 15 May 2025, Senator Antoinette Guhl introduced a bill to strength - en environmental CJIPs (CJIPe). The proposal fol - lowed criticism from the Senate inquiry report, which denounced a perceived lack of transparency and leni - ency in negotiated settlements. The bill seeks to amend Article 41-1-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in three main ways: • restricting the scope of CJIPs to environmental offences only, excluding connected commercial or financial offences;
• expanding participation in negotiations to include local authorities and approved environmental asso - ciations, in the name of transparency; and • setting a minimum threshold for fines – no less than 10% of the company’s average annual turno - ver – to prevent overly modest penalties. While the first two reforms aim to reinforce account - ability and inclusiveness, they also risk undermining the flexibility and attractiveness that make CJIPs an effective enforcement tool. In particular, the exclusion of related offences from the CJIP framework could prove counterproductive. Under the current system, prosecutors may include offences “connected” to the main environmental viola - tion – such as false advertising, document forgery, or breaches of commercial law – within a single CJIP. For example, the CJIP concluded between the National Financial Prosecutor’s Office and Paprec Group on 10 February 2015 is notable for including connect - ed offences, such as cartel participation, within its scope, expanding the application of the CJIP beyond environmental violations, even though there is a legal debate on the application of this criminal offence to legal entities. From a strategic standpoint, the incentive for a com - pany to co-operate, disclose internal documents, and accept partial responsibility would be significantly reduced if parallel proceedings on related commer - cial or financial charges were still likely to be brought before a criminal court. Similarly, the mandatory minimum fine would reduce the prosecutor’s room for negotiation and limit the ability to tailor the sanction to a company’s financial situation or co-operation level. Meanwhile, the broad - er participation of third parties (local authorities, asso - ciations, victims) could extend negotiation timelines and compromise the confidentiality necessary for bal - anced discussions. Ultimately, these measures risk weakening the appeal and efficiency of the CJIP model, which, while aiming for transparency and democratic oversight, destabi - lises the balance between sanction, negotiation, and
70 CHAMBERS.COM
Powered by FlippingBook