DENMARK Law and Practice Contributed by: Johannes Hedegaard and Tobias Bøgh, Bruun & Hjejle
Article 45 are substantiated. Thus, enforcement may be refused if: • the judgment is manifestly contrary to Danish pub - lic policy (ordre public); • the writ of summons, etc, in judgments given by default has not been properly served on the defendant; • the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given between the same parties in Denmark; • the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another member state or in a third state involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for recog - nition in Denmark; • the Brussels I Regulation’s rules on jurisdiction in insurance, consumer and individual labour contract cases have been violated; or • the judgment is contrary to the Brussels I Regula - tion’s rules on exclusive jurisdiction. In accordance with Article 41 (2) of the Brussels I Reg - ulation, enforcement may also be refused or suspend - ed on the basis of grounds for refusal or suspension under national law, provided that such grounds are not incompatible with those provided for in Article 45. This means, inter alia, that enforcement may be refused or suspended if the conditions set out in Sections 501 or 502 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act are fulfilled (see 2.5 Challenging Enforcement of Domes- tic Judgments ). Also, according to Article 51, enforcement proceed - ings may be stayed if an ordinary appeal has been lodged against the judgment in the member state of origin or if the time for such an appeal has not yet expired. An applicable judgment of another state under the Brussels I Regulation may not be reviewed as to its substance. Lugano Convention As previously stated, according to the Lugano Con - vention, a judgment given in a state bound by the con - vention and enforceable in that state shall be enforced in another state bound by the convention, including
Denmark, when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there. A declaration of enforceability shall be refused only on one of the grounds specified in Articles 34 and 35. According to these, enforcement of a judgment shall be refused on grounds which largely replicate the grounds for refusal set out in Article 45 of the Brussels I Regulation. The judgment may not be reviewed as to its sub - stance. According to Article 46 of the Lugano Convention, upon application by the party against whom enforce - ment is sought, the decision on whether to declare a judgment enforceable may be stayed if an ordinary appeal has been lodged against the judgment in the state of origin, or if the period for lodging such an appeal has not yet expired. In a recent 2024 deci - sion, the Eastern High Court (published in the Danish Weekly Law Reports as UfR 2025.455 V) confirmed that the determination of whether to grant a stay pur - suant to Article 46 of the Lugano Convention requires a balancing of interests between the creditor and the debtor. This approach is consistent with the principles established by the ECJ in Case C-183/90, Van Dalfsen As previously stated, according to the Hague Conven - tion, a judgment given by a court of a contracting state designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be enforced in other contracting states, including in Denmark, if it is enforceable in the state of origin. Enforcement pursuant to the Hague Convention may be refused only on the grounds specified in the con - vention. Without prejudice to such review as is neces - sary for determining whether the Hague Convention is applicable to the judgment, there may be no review of the merits of the judgment given by the court of origin. Recognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if the judgment is the subject of review in the state of origin, or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not expired. In addition, enforcement may be refused if: et al, paragraph 23. Hague Convention
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