GERMANY TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS Contributed by: Daniel Möritz, Jan Bonhage, Hendrik Bockenheimer, Carl-Philipp Eberlein, Markus Ernst, Matthias Rothkopf, Christoph Wilken and Alexander Rang, Hengeler Mueller
illustrated by a brief analysis of recent interventions related to Chinese investments. In April 2022, the German government blocked the acquisition of the medical device producer Heyer Medical by the Chinese Aeonmed group. Aeonmed challenged the blocking in court and obtained a favourable judgment in November 2023 (final). How - ever, this judgment had a focus on procedural mat - ters such as due process requirements rather than on substantive security-related considerations. Further FDI prohibitions occurred in 2022. The Ger - man government blocked the acquisition of Elmos Semiconductor SE by the Chinese Sai Microelec - tronics group and a further Chinese investment in the German semiconductor company ERS Electronics (November 2022) and limited a proposed 35% invest - ment by the shipping and logistics company China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) in the German container terminal operator HHLA Container Terminal Tollerort GmbH to a slightly below 25% sharehold - ing investment in a partial blocking decision (October 2022). Moreover, the business combination between the German semiconductor company Siltronic AG and the Taiwan-based GlobalWafers Co Ltd failed owing to security-related concerns in the FDI screening in early 2022. In September 2023, the German government prohib - ited the intended redemption of shares of a minority shareholder in KLEO Connect GmbH by the Chinese majority shareholder Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology. The MoE qualified the redemption of shares and the automatic increase of voting rights in favour of three Chinese shareholders as reviewable acquisition. In July 2024, the German government blocked the intended acquisition of the gas turbine business of MAN Energy Solutions by the Chinese company CSIC Longjiang Guanghan Gas Turbine. Recently, the MoE showed interest in the attempted takeover of a German gas network operator by an Italian company indirectly partly held by a Chinese investor, likely based on concerns related to sensitive information on the German gas grid. An envisaged
merger between a Chinese and a German (technology) retailer may also be in focus of the MoE. In addition, it can be assumed that the security con - cerns of German authorities have discouraged further transactions. EU co-operation mechanism under the EU Screening Regulation At EU level, the EU Screening Regulation provides a framework for FDI screening by the EU member states. The EU Screening Regulation has been fully applicable since 11 October 2020. It does not create a separate EU investment screening procedure but, rather, leaves it up to EU member states whether they screen FDIs. If EU member states carry out FDI screenings, they must comply with the procedural rules and certain minimum standards of the EU Screening Regulation, including on transparency, non-discrimination among foreign investors, confidentiality of information exchanged, recourse against decisions, and measures to identify and prevent circumvention. The EU Screening Regu - lation introduced a co-operation mechanism for the exchange of information between EU member states and the EC, including the right to comment. In 2024, the EU member states submitted 477 notifications of FDI screenings to the EC and the other member states under this mechanism. If a foreign investment in an EU member state does not undergo screening, other member states may comment and the EC may provide an opinion within 15 months of completion of the foreign investment. However, EU member states have the last word on whether a specific investment within the scope of their respective screening scheme should be allowed or not. In December 2025, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU reached a political agreement on the revision of the EU Screening Regulation that includes enhanced co-operation and transparency mecha - nisms, further harmonisation of the national screen - ing procedures and an extended scope of covered sensitive business activities (inter alia covering dual- use items, critical raw materials and critical entities in energy, transport and digital infrastructure). The Council and the European Parliament will consider
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