Merger Control 2025

INDONESIA Law and Practice Contributed by: Chandrawati Dewi, Gustaaf Reerink and Bilal Anwari, ABNR Counsellors at Law

venture parents within the context of merger control.

far been required to address non-competition issues. 5.3 Legal Standard There is no legal standard that remedies must meet in order to be deemed acceptable. The KPPU’s opinion must contain a description and timeline for: • structural remedies actions by the undertak - ing; • behavioural remedies by the undertaking; and/or • implementation of fair pricing strategies. 5.4 Negotiating Remedies With Authorities When the result of the KPPU’s comprehensive review indicates that the transaction could lead to monopolistic practices or unfair competition, the KPPU will convene a commission panel that will decide on the results of the review. The panel will then summon the notifying party to an initial hearing, where the KPPU investiga - tor will explain the results of the comprehen - sive review and the proposed remedies, along with the timeline for their implementation. The notifying party will be given the opportunity to respond. If the notifying party accepts the proposed rem - edies, the panel will issue a conditional approval that imposes the remedies. If the notifying party rejects the proposed remedies, it must submit a legal, economic and/or technical basis for the rejection and the case will continue to a further hearing, where the notifying party is expected to submit its counter-proposal for the remedies.

5. Decision: Prohibitions and Remedies 5.1 Authorities’ Ability to Prohibit or Interfere With Transactions The KPPU does not have the authority to pro - hibit or interfere in transactions within the frame - work of merger control. However, the authority can always initiate a formal investigation within the framework of cartel rules or abuse of domi - nance rules or other potential violations under the Competition Law. 5.2 Parties’ Ability to Negotiate Remedies If the KPPU has concerns about a transaction, the parties can negotiate structural remedies or behavioural remedies. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the KPPU has so far only agreed to or imposed behavioural remedies, rather than structural remedies. The remedies may consist of structural remedies (ie, share or asset divestment) or behavioural remedies, such as: • access to IP rights related to essential facili - ties; or • elimination of competition barriers, such as exclusive contracts, consumer switching costs, tying or bundling, and supply or pur - chase barriers. The KPPU has so far imposed behavioural remedies in at least five cases, usually consist - ing of reporting requirements. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no remedies have so

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