MONTENEGRO Law and Practice Contributed by: Bisera Andrijasevic and Marija Ksenija Popović, BDK Advokati
nant position, using the criteria outlined in 4.1 Substantive Test . The Agency primarily investigates the effects on horizontally affected markets, concentrating on unilateral effects, especially in cases where there is a significant increase in market share or the elimination of a close competitor. In cases where the parties are active on different levels of the supply chain in related markets, the Agency will investigate potential foreclosure effects. Con - versely, the Agency rarely focuses on co-ordi - nated effects, conglomerate or portfolio effects, elimination of potential competition, or concerns related to innovation. 4.5 Economic Efficiencies The Agency considers the economic efficiencies of a concentration put forward by the parties in the notification, particularly if these efficien - cies benefit consumers. However, this is not frequently presented by the parties, and there are no publicly available decisions in which the Agency has analysed the economic efficiencies resulting from a merger. 4.6 Non-Competition Issues The Agency does not, and is not mandated to, take non-competition concerns into account when reviewing concentrations. Montenegro has not yet introduced separate rules for the notification of foreign direct invest - ments. 4.7 Special Consideration for Joint Ventures The substantive review of full-function joint ven - tures is conducted based on the same substan - tive test outlined in section 4.1 Substantive Test . The Agency may also consider any spill-over effects on the activities of the parent companies
opment of potential competitors and barriers to market entry. While the Agency reviews the market definition proposed by the notifying parties, it is not bound by their suggestion. The Agency relies on its own precedents and the European Commission’s decisional practice. Notifying parties are advised to support their market definition proposals with relevant precedents from EU case law. In practice, the Agency primarily focuses on markets where both parties to a concentration are active, particularly those involving horizontal overlaps. There is no de minimis threshold, and the Agency also evaluates markets where the parties are active at different levels of the supply chain to assess any potential competitive impact on vertically related markets. In concentrations where the parties’ activities do not overlap and there are no vertically affected markets, the Agency typically analyses the rele - vant market based on where the target is active. If there are no competitive concerns because the parties are not present in the relevant market, the Agency generally leaves the market defini - tion open. 4.3 Reliance on Case Law The Agency relies on its own decisional prac - tice, which is mostly not publicly available, as the explanatory parts of merger decisions are not published. In addition, the Agency also draws on the European Commission’s case law. 4.4 Competition Concerns The Agency assesses whether to approve a con - centration by evaluating its impact on prevent - ing, restricting or distorting effective competi - tion in the Montenegrin market, with a particular focus on the creation or strengthening of a domi -
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