Family Law 2025

CANADA Trends and Developments Contributed by: Heather Hansen, Shannon Beddoe, Maureen Edwards and Victoria Lunetta, McCarthy Hansen & Company LLP

considerations are not synonymous. Nor are they necessarily mutually reinforcing. Courts should only give effect to the parenting time fac - tor to the extent that it is in the best interests of the child.” Den Duyf v Den Duyf, 2024 BCSC 2151 In this matter, the parties separated after a four- year relationship. The father moved to Pember - ton, British Columbia, while the mother lived with the child on the mainland. The parties entered a consent order providing the father with par - enting time. The mother sought to relocate with the child to Salt Spring Island (a substantial dis - tance away) on a final basis or, alternatively, on an interim basis. The mother argued that reloca - tion would assist the mother’s work experience and skill. The mother’s application for interim and tempo - rary relocation was dismissed. The judge also elected not to implement a 50/50 parenting time schedule. Although the mother was the child’s primary caregiver, the child has close relation - ships with his father and grandparents, and the judge considered that the disadvantages of a relocation outweighed the advantages. The judge also reasoned that moving directly to a shared parenting schedule would be too much of a change for the child. However, the judge found that an increase in the father’s parenting time would be in the best interests of the child. The judge considered and applied Barendregt in ordering parenting time consistent with best interests of the child. At paragraph 122, the court held that remain - ing in place “would help foster and maintain his relationship with his father as he develops, which happens quickly at this age”.

CK v MK, 2024 ABKB 626 In this case, the parties were married and sepa - rated after 17 years. During their marriage, they had two children together. The mother struggled with substance abuse, and it had affected the family and the children. The father sought sole parenting and decision-making for the children. The court considered what was an appropriate order for parenting and decision-making. At par - agraphs 194‒196, the court held: “CK [the father] shall have primary parenting and sole decision- making responsibility for the children. MK [the mother] shall be entitled to information from CK regarding the children’s education, health and extracurricular activities and interests at her request. […]. Any parenting time for MK, whether by phone, video or in person, shall be at CK’s discretion, having considered the express pref - erences and wishes of the children.” In making the parenting order, the judged con - sidered that, based on Section 16(6) of the Divorce Act, the children should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with their best interests. The court held that, as a result of MK’s limited ability to care for the children, and as a result of the impact of the family violence upon the children (caused by MK), it was not in the best interests of the children to have a specified parenting schedule with MK. The court also found that was potentially not possible for the mother to have any parenting time with one of the children depending on the outcome of the mother’s sentencing regarding her assault charge. Conclusion Today, greater clarity and certainty exists in both the common law and legislation around the need for individualised best-interests analyses and the absence of any presumption with respect

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