ISRAEL Law and Practice Contributed by: Joseph Sprinzak and Rahel Rimon, J.SPRINZAK
fined to individuals entitled to immediate pos - session of the property, and any party with a legitimate right of recourse may avail themselves of this remedy. The Court dismissed concerns that broadening this right would overwhelm the judicial system. The Court also held that the assignment of a right to sue from an insurer to an individual cre - ates a cause of action that is not tortious and therefore not subject to the limitation in Section 22 of the Torts Ordinance; therefore, there is no impediment to the assignment of the right to sue. The Court explained that a significant rea - son for prohibiting the assignment of the right in torts is that it is sometimes a personal right, which cannot be reduced to a purely monetary right. However, no “personal” element exists in a claim for compensation for damage caused to machinery. Certain statutory provisions in Israeli law also specifically allow for the assignment of claims, such as subrogation under Section 62 of the Insurance Contract Law, 1981. This provision enables an insurer to step into the shoes of the insured to recover damages from a third party. It should be noted that in Bellina Maritime SA Monrovia v Menora Insurance Company Ltd (2002), which interpreted Section III(6a) of the Hague-Visby Rules providing for a one-year time limit for claims by cargo owners against the car - rier, the Supreme Court determined that the car - rier, as a direct party to the bill of lading, is not a “third party” in relation to the cargo owner. When the insurer steps into the shoes of the cargo owner through subrogation, the carrier remains a direct counterparty, not a third party. In addi - tion, the insurer is bound by the same one-year time limitation under Section III(6) that applies to the cargo owner. The Supreme Court held
that the District Court had erroneously treated the insurer’s subrogation claim as falling under Section III(6a)’s exception for third-party indem - nity claims. The Supreme Court overturned this, emphasising that subrogation does not alter the direct relationship between the insured and the carrier. It should be noted that, according to Article 8 of the Ordinance (and without derogating from Arti - cle I(b) and Article III Part 4 of the Hague-Visby Rules and any other provisions of law), the party to whom the cargo was consigned (the consign - ee) and the party to whom the bill of lading was duly endorsed (the endorsee) are considered, as applicable, as a party to the bill of lading, and as such are entitled to all the rights arising from the transaction pursuant to which the bill was made, and subject to the obligations referring to that transaction in exercising their aforemen - tioned rights. Finally, the Israeli Supreme Court has also recently recognised the right of foreign insurers to institute subrogation proceedings in Israel. See also 9. Additional Maritime or Shipping Issues . 3.3 Ship-Owners’ Liability and Limitation of Liability for Cargo Damages The limitation of liability regime available to car - riers is as set out in the Hague-Visby Rules, as amended by the 1979 Protocol, and, where appropriate, the provisions of the Israeli Ship - ping (Limitation on a Ship-owner’s Liability) Law – 1965, as amended in 1987. See also 2.3 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Mari- time Claims and 9.1 Other Jurisdiction-Specific Shipping and Maritime Issue s.
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