SWEDEN Law and Practice Contributed by: Michele Fara, Ninos Aho, Paula Bäckdén and Anders Leissner, Advokatfirman Vinge KB
a sanctions breach has been committed within the ambit of the company’s operations. Sanctions breaches are investigated by the Swedish Security Service or the Special Branch of the Prosecutor’s Office. The implications sanctions have for shipping (as well as other) contracts will depend on the contractual terms, and the interpretation of the same. There is very little public case law in Sweden regarding sanc - tions breaches. The lack of public judgments from sanctions-related commercial disputes may be explained by the fact that most com - mercial disputes in Sweden are referred to pri - vate arbitration. The administration of sanctions is performed by several agencies, of which the two most promi - nent are the Inspectorate of Strategic Products and the National Board of Trade Sweden. There is no mechanism to grant authorisations or per - mits beyond what the respective sanctions leg - islation provides for. In 2024, the Swedish government took several steps to enhance the focus on sanctions, and sanctions compliance, amongst agencies and in business life. Amongst other things, a new sanctions law will be enacted in 2025, which in various ways will entail extended liability for sanctions breaches. Trade sanctions against Russia and the non- governmental controlled areas in Ukraine have had a large impact on Sweden’s business life, including shipping. The main legal instruments regarding the EU’s sanctions against Russia are EU Regulation 833/2014, EU Regulation 269/2014 and EU Regulation 1351/2014. One of the most relevant provisions for the shipping industry is probably the prohibition on provid - ing technical assistance, brokering services or
financing or financial assistance, related to the trading, brokering or transport of certain Rus - sian oil products below a price cap (Article 3n of Council Regulation 833/2014). Since shipping generally involves the transport of goods, is international and often involves complex networks of business partners, ship - ping companies inherently have a high degree of exposure to trade as well as financial sanctions. 8.4 International Conflict(s) Recent geopolitical developments, as well as experiences related to the COVID-19 pandem - ic, have prompted the Swedish government to take several steps towards strengthening Swed - ish shipping (see 7.1 Exemptions or Tax Reliefs on the Income of a Ship-Owner’s Companies ). Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has had a signif - icant impact on Swedish shipping (see 8.3 Trade Sanctions ), most notably for businesses that have had business dealings with Russia. How - ever, the concepts of force majeure (to the extent that this exists under Swedish law) and frustra - tion per se do not appear to have changed. One major topic at the time of writing is how Sweden and other Baltic states should react to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, which compris - es poorly insured tankers that also apparently conduct sabotage operations against sea-bed infrastructure. Approximately 90 of these ves - sels are estimated to leave Russian ports in the Baltic Sea every month, laden with Russian oil, transiting the Gulf of Finland, Danish Straits and the English Channel.
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