Litigation 2025

Cayman ISLANDS Law and Practice Contributed by: Sam Dawson, Peter Sherwood and Denis Olarou, Carey Olsen

practice is not to identify “winners” and “losers” but to order costs to be in the cause. In the absence of an order for earlier payment, the default position on when interim application costs will fall to be paid is that all such costs will, unless they are agreed earlier by the parties, be assessed and become payable after the conclu- sion of the case. However, the court does have jurisdiction to order interim payment on account of costs in an amount to be assessed summarily, in which case such payment may be due within a reasonable time after the order is made. 4.7 Application/Motion Timeframe The timeframe for the court to deal with a par- ticular application will depend on the complexity of the application and the availability of court time. The parties are required to indicate a time esti- mate for the hearing of their applications when filing them with the court. In light of the time esti- mate, the court fixes the hearing of the applica- tion based on judicial availability as well as the availability of the parties’ respective counsel. Depending on the indicated hearing time esti- mate, different schedules for the filing of evi- dence and submissions will apply. Applications estimated to take no more than three hours of hearing time are known as “ordinary” applica- tions and the standard timetable for their dis - posal envisages evidence in answer within 14 days of the application, evidence in reply within seven days of that, and the filing of skeleton arguments and hearing bundles not later than three business days before hearing. This implies a lead time to hearing of at least 24 days from application. Applications with a longer estimated hearing time are deemed “lengthy” and have a more extended timetable.

In practice, the timetable may be abridged by agreement of the parties. Furthermore, while these timetables should always be followed (and failure to do so may well incur, at the very least, the disapprobation of the judge), strictly speak- ing, they have the force of guidance and settled practice rather than the force of court rules and they may be departed from in cases where a more urgent hearing of the matter is properly jus- tified. In principle, an application may be issued and served on the respondent with as little as four days’ notice of the hearing (Order 32, Rule 3(2) of the Grand Court Rules), while an appli- cation for an extension of time may be served with just one day’s notice (Order 32, Rule 3(1) of the Grand Court Rules). However, while strictly within the rules, the party making an application on such short notice may need to be prepared to justify the urgency and the need to depart from the guideline timetables for exchange of evidence. In those circumstances, adjournment of the hearing at the request of the respondent (and cost consequences) is a risk. Therefore, the timeframe for hearing can vary very widely. A simple application on a discrete issue, for example for extension of time, might be heard within a matter of days. A complex application, such as a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction or for strike-out or summary judg- ment on a significant case, may well require sev- eral days’ worth of hearing time and might not be heard for several months. However, the court always strives to accommo- date truly urgent ex parte applications for freez- ing orders, injunctions, appointment of provi- sional liquidators and the like on an expedited basis. Such truly urgent applications can be heard within a matter of days or, in exceptional cases, even hours, provided the court is satisfied of the urgency.

267 CHAMBERS.COM

Powered by