USA – IDAHO Trends and Developments Contributed by: Tyler Anderson, Carsten Peterson, Tracy Wright and Christian Moak, Hawley Troxell
The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court’s decision, finding that: • the limited partners did not plead with particular - ity why demand on all general partners would be futile, and thus lacked standing to bring derivative claims; • the limited partners did not suffer any injury distinct from injuries allegedly suffered by the partnership, and thus lacked standing to bring direct action; • the limited partners did not suffer any injury distinct from injuries allegedly suffered by the partnership, and thus lacked standing to seek expulsion; and • appeal by the limited partners was brought frivo - lously, unreasonably and without foundation, and thus general partners were entitled to attorney fees and costs under statute. In responding to the plaintiffs’ appeal from the dis - trict court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12 (b)(6), the Oxarangos sought attorney’s fees under IC Section 12-121, asserting that “Hyde/Reaney pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably and without founda - tion”. See Hyde 2026 WL 478542, at *10. The Court set forth the standard by which it considered a ruling under IC Section 12-121: “An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code Sec - tion 12-121 will be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal only when this Court is left with the abiding belief that the entire appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without founda- tion” (see Edwards v Lane […] 578 P3d 525, 531–32 (2025) (quoting Severinsen v Tueller , 174 Idaho 669, 681, 559 P.3d 771, 783 (2024)). “[W]hen a party pur - sues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and with - out foundation” (see Garner v Povey , 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 P3d 608, 614 (2011) (quoting C & G , Inc v Rule , 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P3d 76, 82 (2001)). “An award of fees under Section 12-121 is within this Court’s discretion” (see Aizpitarte v Minear , 170 Idaho 186, 203, 508 P3d 1260, 1277 (2022) (citing Owen v Smith , 168 Idaho 633, 648, 485 P.3d 129, 144 (2021)). Id.
In finding that an award of fees and costs was appro - priate under IC Section 12-121, the Court noted that Hyde and Reaney’s arguments were poorly reasoned, and that “Hyde/Reaney failed to comply with [the] pleading requirement, and their appeal merely invites this Court to second-guess the district court’s deci - sion… as a result, we conclude that the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, and without foun - dation”. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court used almost identical lan - guage in Bickerstaff v Bickerstaff in support of their decision to award attorney fees under IC Section 12-121, noting that “[a] prevailing party is also enti - tled to attorney fees under the statute ‘if the appeal merely invites the appellate court to second-guess the trial court on the weight of evidence’” (citing Crow- ley v Critchfield , 145 Idaho 509, 514, 181 P3d 435, 440 (2007)) and that the “arguments on appeal simply asked us to reweigh evidence and second-guess the magistrate court’s findings”. See Bickerstaff v Bicker - staff , No 53588, 2026 WL 1261279, *24 (8 May 2026). In Spears v Antelope Mountain Resort , LLC , family members of a deceased employee brought action for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) against the employer and employer’s limited liability company, following the murder of an employee by the employer’s grandson who resided on the employer’s property; the district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favour of the defend - ants, and the plaintiffs appealed. See Spears v Ante- lope Mountain Resort , LLC , 585 P3d 314 (2026). On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found in favour of the respondents, and held that: • the employment relationship did not reflect the degree of custody and control quintessential to the special relationship from which a duty to aid or protect could arise, thus precluding wrongful-death claims; • the defendants did not voluntarily assume the duty to aid or protect the employee, thus precluding wrongful-death claims; • the defendants’ purported failure to warn or oth - erwise protect the employee did not amount to
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